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In a short space of time, two international courts have handed down rather dramatic 
decisions related to the contested issues of self-determination and sovereignty of the 
Chagos Archipelago and Palestine, which have, for a very long time now, been under the UK 
and Israeli occupation respectively. 
 
On 28 January 2021, an ITLOS Special Chamber found that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate 
upon the dispute between Mauritius and the Maldives concerning the delimitation of the 
maritime boundary between the two states, concluding that Mauritius can be regarded as 
the coastal State in respect of the Chagos Archipelago within the meaning of article 74, 
paragraph 1, and article 83, paragraph 1, of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS). It also found that the UK is not an indispensable party to the proceedings, which 
would have barred the Chamber from exercising jurisdiction under the so-called Monetary 
Gold principle. 
Shortly after, on 5 February 2021, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC ruled that Palestine is a 
State Party to the Rome Statute, hence ‘’[t]he State on the territory of which the conduct in 
question occurred’’ within the meaning of Article 12(2)(a) of the Statute and found that the 
Court’s territorial jurisdiction extends to the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, 
namely Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.  
This comment proceeds on the premise that sovereignty is, in legal terms, a bundle of 
rights. International institutions, such as the ICC and ITLOS, possess differentiated roles in 
determining the extent of rights flowing from sovereignty. The effect of ‘institutional 
determinations’ on sovereign rights is to take certain issues out of the realm of arguable fact 
into the realm of legal fact. Institutional determinations can in this way be considered as 
‘consolidatory’ based on their reliance on these legal facts and drawing further legal 
implications from it. Institutional determinations may in this way be either constitutive or 
declaratory of sovereign rights.   
This distinctiveness of this ‘institutional’ approach becomes clearer if juxtaposed to Sarah 
Thin’s critical contribution to this blog. Thin posits that the ITLOS Special Chamber’s 
judgment did not change the perspective on the territorial sovereignty issues. As she argues, 
the ITLOS Special Chamber by resorting to the ‘legal effect’ of the ICJ’s AO could not simply 
extinguish the dispute between the UK and Mauritius. For Thin, the authoritative 
statements of law (including non-binding AO) do not necessarily have legal effects able to 
alter the rights or obligations of international legal subjects, especially if the parties to the 
dispute are different. Moreover, as she correctly observes, the Special Chamber did not 
unambiguously state that the Chagos Archipelago fell within Mauritius’ territory, but only 
noted that the ICJ’s conclusions ‘’have implications for the legal status of’’ the Archipelago. 
Ultimately, that cannot be any different since the Part XV dispute settlement forms do not 
have jurisdiction over sovereignty over land.  
However, both courts actually make determinations that consolidate the position. The ITLOS 
Special Chamber did, for one, accept the GA determination as a given and, on that basis, 
proceeded to spell out an implication. That aspect is the treaty-based right, as the coastal 
state, to consent to the merits of delimitation around the Chagos. It is Mauritius, not the UK 
that consents to these effects. In other words, the Chamber ipso iure allocates that right to 
the former. It is on this effect and the underlying conception of sovereignty as a bundle of 
rights that this comment focuses. This piece first explains the institutional approach towards 
determining the right to self-determination and status of the Chagos Archipelago and 
Palestine, that comprises UNGA resolutions, ICJ advisory opinions and the two judicial 
rulings. The piece then discusses the precise legal effects of these two recent judicial 
determinations. It finally surveys their initial practical ramifications in states’ reactions and 
scholarly opinion. 
 
A recent history of institutional determination of self-determination and status in the 
Chagos Archipelago and Palestine cases 
In February 2019, the ICJ issued the Chagos Archipelago Advisory Opinion (later the CAO) 
which was a defeat for the UK (see here). The Court not only spelled out the UK’s obligation 
to bring an end to its administration of the Chagos Archipelago but also stated that such an 
administration constitutes a wrongful act entailing the international responsibility of the UK 
(paras. 177-178). The Court underlined that the right to self-determination creates an 
obligation erga omnes and all States have to cooperate with each other and comply with the 
General Assembly’s proposals to complete the decolonization of Mauritius, which includes 
the resettlement of previously expelled Chagossians (paras. 180-181). 
The UNGA acted upon the opinion with Resolution 73/295 in May 2019, affirming that all 
states have an obligation to respect the Chagossians’ right to self-determination (para. 2 of 
the resolution); demanding that “the United Kingdom … withdraw its colonial administration 
from the Chagos Archipelago unconditionally within a period of no more than six months” 
(para. 3 of the resolution); urging “the United Kingdom… to cooperate with Mauritius in 
facilitating the resettlement of Mauritian nationals’’ (para. 4 of the resolution). 
On 28 January 2021, the ITLOS Special Chamber heavily relied on the CAO and Resolution 
73/295 in its determination of the legal status of the Chagos Archipelago. According to the 
Chamber, the UK was not deemed an indispensable State Party within the Monetary Gold 
principle. In the Monetary Gold case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated that it 
cannot exercise its jurisdiction over a question when a third state's legal interests would … 
‘’form the very subject-matter of the decision’’. But, so the Chamber opined since the legal 
status of the Chagos Archipelago has been ‘clarified’ by the CAO and Resolution 73/295 and 
there is no longer a sovereignty dispute between Mauritius and the UK (contrary to what 
the Arbitral Tribunal in the Chagos arbitral award had maintained). Currently, the UK’s claim 
to territory can be characterized as a ‘mere assertion’ (para. 243 of the judgment), while its 
continued administration is a breach of international law (para. 245 of the judgment). Hence 
it is Mauritius that possesses fishing rights and the right to the benefit of minerals or oil 
discovered (para. 246 of the judgment). The Chamber, referring to the CAO, emphasized 
that the detachment of the Chagos Archipelago by the UK from Mauritius in 1965 (3 years 
before it declared independence) violated Mauritius’ territorial integrity, the decolonization 
process, and that people’s right to self-determination (paras. 172- 174 the judgment).  
This institutional process involving the UNGA, the ICJ and a specialised court has a parallel in 
the institutional legal process regarding Palestine’s situation, both in terms of hierarchy and 
outcomes. Namely, in 2004 the ICJ issued the Wall Advisory Opinion (later the WAO), in 
which it confirmed that Israel since 1967 occupies illegally Palestinian territories (paras. 73, 
78 of the WAO) and recalled UNSC Resolution 242 providing that no territories could be 
acquired by force and that Israel should withdraw from the occupied territories (para. 74 of 
the WAO). The ICJ declared that the Palestinians have the inalienable right to self-
determination and that Israel by ignoring this right is in breach of the erga omnes obligation. 
It was also in breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention (paras. 155, 159). 
UNGA Resolution 67/19 of 9 November 2012, apart from upgrading Palestine’s status to 
non-member observer state (for a debate on whether such a status is tantamount to 
Palestinian statehood see here and here); recalled the WAO, and reaffirmed former 
resolutions stressing ‘’the need for the withdrawal of Israel from the Palestinian territory 
occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, the realization of the inalienable rights of the 
Palestinian people, primarily the right to self-determination and the right to their 
independent State, and a just resolution of the problem of the Palestine refugees’’. 
Finally, on 5 February 2021 the Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC determined, that the 
Monetary Gold principle did not apply to require Israeli presence in the case (the ICC is not 
an inter-State court and Israel was indeed invited but declined to participate), and that 
Palestine is a State for the purpose of the ICC Statute. The Chamber found it appropriate to 
resort to Article 31(1) of the VCLT and interpret article 12(2)(a) in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of the 
object and purpose of the Statute. Moreover, the Pre-Trial Chamber heavily relied upon the 
UNGA Resolution 67/19, and like the ITLOS Special Chamber, concluded that the subsequent 
UN legal pronouncements (mutatis mutandis) could clarify the entity’s legal status – 
Palestine has in effect become a State, yet only in relation to accession to treaties (para. 98 
of the decision). Still, the Pre-Trial Chamber, also referring to the UNGA Resolution 67/19, 
noted that the territories of Palestine since 1967 are under Israeli occupation and that the 
Palestinian people have the right to self-determination and independence in their State of 
Palestine and on that basis concluded that the Court’s territorial jurisdiction extends to Gaza 
and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem (paras. 116-123 of the decision). 
 
The effects of the ITLOS Special Chamber’s judgment and the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s 
decision on the legal status of the Chagos Archipelago and Palestine. Sovereignty as a 
bundle of rights 
The ITLOS Special Chamber’s judgement and the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision contribute 
towards Palestinian and Mauritian self-determination, yet due to the general lack of 
competence of the ITLOS and ICC to adjudicate on sovereignty-based issues, their effect 
requires careful analysis. Indeed, that effect is bifurcated.  
This can be explained using the distinction between the two types of effects a legal act can 
have. Accordingly, an act can be merely declaratory of a pre-existing legal situation. 
Alternatively, if it creates a new legal situation, then the act can be said to be constitutive. 
In the present context, the rulings are both declaratory and constitutive. They have a 
declaratory effect as to sovereignty as a whole. The ITLOS Chamber refers to the prior UNGA 
resolutions, with their bindingness as confirmed by the CAO, and then merely states that 
their effect as to sovereignty is immediate. At the same time, the ITLOS’s Special Chamber 
remarked that a dispute, which requires the determination of a question of territorial 
sovereignty, may not be regarded as a dispute concerning the interpretation or application 
of the Convention under article 288, paragraph 1, of the UNCLOS and that Parties seem to 
agree with that (paras. 110-111).   
The Pre-Trial Chamber also refers to the existing situation in a declaratory manner. As to 
sovereignty tout court, for instance, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber explicitly pronounced that it 
is neither adjudicating a border dispute under international law nor prejudging the question 
of any future borders (para. 113). The Chamber also submitted the ICC is not 
constitutionally competent to determine matters of statehood that would bind the 
international community. In addition, such a determination is not required for the specific 
purposes of the present proceedings or the general exercise of the Court’s mandate (para. 
108). According to the Chamber ‘’[t]he territoriality of criminal law […] is not an absolute 
principle of international law and by no means coincides with territorial sovereignty’’ (para. 
68).  
Yet both rulings then also have a constitutive effect on an aspect of sovereignty manifest in 
the exercise of a treaty-right. On that aspect they rule constitutively, allocating it to the 
entity supported by self-determination.  In this constitutive sense, the ITLOS Special 
Chamber rules on and allocates the right of the coastal state to formulate a claim under 
UNCLOS on the adjacent ocean spaces. For the ITLOS Special Chamber did, accept the GA 
determination as a given and, on that basis, proceeded to spell out an implication, ruling 
with constitutive effect on the aspect of sovereignty that is under its jurisdiction. That 
aspect is the treaty-based right, as the coastal state, to consent to the merits of delimitation 
around the Chagos. It is Mauritius, not the UK that consents. 
With reference to the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision, it similarly did rule with constitutive 
effect on another aspect of sovereignty. That aspect is the treaty-based right to permit the 
exercise of ICC jurisdiction over a certain territory. It is a legal right, and it is allocated to 
Palestine. Admittedly, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision was supported by a smaller 
majority than the essentially unanimous ITLOS judgment, where only Judge ad hoc Oxman 
dissented and on an unrelated ground. It was a 2-1 decision with presiding Judge Kovács 
dissenting on Palestine’s being considered as “[t]he State on the territory of which the 
conduct in question occurred" under Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute as well as to the 
point that the Court’s territorial jurisdiction in the situation in Palestine extends to the 
territories occupied by Israel since 1967, namely Gaza and the West Bank, including East 
Jerusalem. Judge Kovács argued, inter alia, that the Oslo Accords, where Palestine 
transferred jurisdiction to Israel in respect of offenses by Israeli, may constitute the obstacle 
to the ICC jurisdiction. The dissent sits alongside plenty of amicus curiae submissions against 
the ICC jurisdiction. 
Both rulings then have very real legal consequences. Those are that the cases may be 
examined on the merits before the ITLOS and the ICC regarding the maritime boundary 
between Mauritius and Maldives and the alleged crimes committed in the occupied 
Palestinian territory since 13 June 2014 respectively. 
This is so regardless of the procedural Monetary Gold point where there is an apparent 
divergence between the two courts. In the ITLOS case, the ITLOS Chamber found the issue 
of sovereignty had been determined and applied the Monetary Gold principle to find the UK 
not indispensable, while the ICC Pre-trial Chamber found the issue of sovereignty not 
determined though Monetary Gold not applicable in that context.  
How, then, can these rulings be understood against the concepts of sovereignty and self-
determination?  It is submitted that the courts treat sovereignty as a bundle of rights, rather 
than as an indivisible whole. Then it becomes possible to identify individual rights from this 
bundle that re-allocate those. Underpinning these operations is the substantive right to self-
determination of the peoples concerned. The rulings spell out the consequences of that 
right within the concept of sovereignty. 
Ramifications: State practice and scholarly opinions   
As this comment has demonstrated, it is the institutional determinations that bring about 
legal change. The comment now turns to the extra-institutional reception. As a practical 
matter, it is of course only realistic to remain cautious as to the effects in particular of the 
Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision since several states opposed the Chamber’s decision on 
jurisdiction (Germany, Australia, Canada, Austria, among others). The USA explicitly 
declared that Palestinians do not ‘’qualify as a sovereign state’’ and they should be barred 
from participating ‘’as a state in international organizations, entities, or conferences, 
including the ICC’’. Israel has likewise questioned the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision, calling 
the ICC a biased, politicized court and urging other States to respect its sovereign right not 
to accept the jurisdiction. Israel, as a non-party to the ICC Statute, may argue that it is a 
complementary court and that Israel itself is able to bring to justice the war perpetrators, 
including Israeli nationals. However, it remains doubtful whether it will be able to fend off 
the accusations of offenses concerning Israel’s settlement activity in the occupied 
territories, including, among others, forbidding the transfer of a civilian population into 
occupied territory (see here).  It is also worth mentioning that the next move (after the ICC 
Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision) belongs to the new ICC Prosecutor. 
As regards the ITLOS Special Chamber’ judgment, the UK, having been most affected by it, 
announced that it does not recognize Mauritius’s claim to the Chagos Archipelago (British 
Indian Ocean Territory) which has been under continuous British sovereignty since 1814. 
Moreover, the Foreign Office stressed that, as not being a party to the proceedings, the UK 
is under no requirement to comply with the ruling. This substantially complicates matters 
and prolongs the sovereignty dispute, at least from the perspective of the UK. It remains to 
be seen whether 56 states that abstained in the voting for the UNGA Resolution 73/295 
(only 6 were against: the US, the UK, Maldives, Australia, Israel and Hungary) will change 
their opinion after the rather clear confirmation of Mauritius’s sovereignty over Chagos by 
the ITLOS Special Chamber. In a similar manner, international legal scholarship may become 
more prolific and assertive regarding the UK’s prolonged occupation, complementing 
existing literature.  
Conclusions   
The following conclusion can be drawn from these two decisions. Self-determination and 
the intended status of statehood with its concomitant bundle of sovereign rights is a legal 
fact. That legal fact is determined by institutional processes that comprise the UNGA, the ICJ 
and international courts under specific treaties, regardless of the facts on the ground, 
although these may follow. In this constitutive subject-matter, international law is moving 
closer to an institutional normative order. 
